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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103-(2)(j) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment when 
it applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384, which has not been adopted in Utah, 
and ruled that Russell Sorensen Construction, as a general contractor, "is subject to the 
same liability, and enjoys the same immunity from liability, as though he were the 
possessor of the land, for bodily harm caused to others within and without the land, while 
the work is in his charge, by the dangerous character of the structure or other condition." 
See, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Russell Sorensen Construction's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, its Memorandum of Points and Authorities Supporting Russell 
Sorensen Construction's Motion for Summary Judgment and Russell Sorensen 
Construction's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and at 
oral argument. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the denial of summary judgment for 
correctness. See, Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 
1995) ("A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is a legal 
one and will be reviewed for correctness. Therefore, all issues in this case will be 
1 
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reviewed de novo, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions.") (internal citations 
omitted). Additionally the trial court's interpretation "of prior precedent, statutes, and the 
common law are questions of law that we review for correctness." See, hire Estate of 
Ostler, 2009 UT 82 \ 7. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment by 
determining that the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint sufficiently alleged a premises 
liability claim against RSC when the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint did not allege that 
RSC either owned or possessed the property where the Plaintiff was injured. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Russell Sorensen Construction's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, its Memorandum of Points and Authorities Supporting Russell 
Sorensen Construction's Motion for Summary Judgment and Russell Sorensen 
Construction's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and at 
oral argument. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the denial of summary judgment for 
correctness. See, Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d at 733. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature, Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This case involves a personal injury claim asserted by Jose M. Gonzalez 
("Gonzalez") against several Defendants, including Russell Sorenson Construction 
("RSC"), Orchard Vista LLC. ("Orchard Vista"), Pacificorp, d/b/a/ Rocky Mountain 
2 
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Power ("RMP"), and R.M. Rees Construction, d/b/a/ Design Stone Creations ("Rees"). 
On September 26, 2008, Gonzalez filed his complaint against RSC, Orchard Vista, RMP, 
and Rees in the Third District Court, alleging negligence and strict liability against all of 
the Defendants. (Record 1). On December 23, 2008, Gonzalez filed a Stipulated Motion 
for Leave to File Amended Complaint. (Record 95). Gonzalez filed his Amended 
Complaint and Jury Demand on January 22, 2009. (Record 126). RSC answered 
Gonzalez' Amended Complaint on February 11, 2009. (Record 161). RSC's Fourteenth 
Affirmative Defense stated: "Plaintiffs claims are barred because Sorensen did not retain 
control over the injury causing aspect of the Plaintiffs work or the work of Plaintiffs 
employer." (Record 168). RSC's Answer further provided notice to all parties of RSC's 
intent to apportion fault to Gonzalez' employer, John Clayton Construction (hereinafter 
"JCC") and specified the grounds for apportionment. (Record 169). 
Following the conclusion of fact discovery and on April 9, 2010, RSC filed 
Russell Sorensen Construction's Motion and Memorandum in Support for Summary 
Judgment as well as its supporting exhibits (hereinafter collectively, "RSC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment"). (Record 759 & 618 - 768). RSC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment sought a dismissal of Gonzalez' negligence claim based upon Utah's retained 
control doctrine. (Record 627 - 637). RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment also sought 
a dismissal of Gonzalez' strict liability claim as the activity at issue, i.e. installing soffit 
3 
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and fascia, was not an "abnormally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous" activity. (Record 637 
-639). 
Gonzalez filed his Memorandum in Opposition with his supporting exhibits on 
May 5, 2010. (Record 825 - 1004). Gonzalez' opposition acknowledged that RSC did 
not retain control over the injury causing aspect of the Gonzalez' work or the work of 
Gonzalez' employer. (Record 839 - 840). Instead, Gonzalez' Opposition attempted to 
re-characterize his claims against RSC as "direct negligence" claims, arising out of a 
"premises liability" analysis. (Record 841 - 851). Gonzalez' direct negligence claims 
are, "based upon the Utah Supreme Court's seminal opinion in Hale v. Beckstead, which 
applied premises liability negligence principles to claims by subcontractors." (Record 
826 - 827). Notwithstanding the fact that RSC did not own or possess the property at 
issue, Gonzalez argued that The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384 imposed premises 
liability upon RSC due to RSC's status as a general contractor. (Record 826 - 851). In 
his Opposition, Gonzalez acknowledged that his direct negligence claims against RSC are 
based upon a "premises liability" theory. (Record 826 - 827). Gonzalez did not oppose 
RSC's second basis for Summary Judgment on the strict liability claim. (Record 825 -
851). 
RSC filed its Reply Memorandum on May 24, 2010. (Record 1029). In its Reply 
RSC argued, inter alia: 
4 
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i. The Plaintiff failed to properly plead a "premises liability" claim 
against RSC as Plaintiff failed to allege that RSC owned or 
possessed the property. 
ii. The Plaintiffs "premises liability" theory was raised for the first 
time in its opposition to a motion for summary judgment; 
consequently the trial court should not consider the same. 
iii. The adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384, is 
inconsistent with the general rule in Utah that "the employer of 
an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused 
to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his 
servants." Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999), and 
would eviscerate the retained control doctrine. 
(Record 1056-1067). 
The trial court heard argument on RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 
21, 2010. (Record 1564). During oral argument, counsel for Gonzalez again 
acknowledged that Gonzalez' claims for direct negligence are solely tied to a premises 
liability analysis. (Record 2219 at Pg. 23 L. 9 - 20). The trial court entered a 
Memorandum Decision on July 30, 2010.1 (Record 1585 - 1589). The trial court denied 
RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment stating "In sum, the Court agrees with Plaintiff 
and concludes that § 384 reflects sound policy and should be applied in the instant." 
(Record 1588). The trial court's memorandum decision did not address RSC's summary 
judgment argument on Gonzalez' strict liability claim notwithstanding the fact that 
Gonzalez did not oppose the same in either his Opposition or during oral argument. 
(Record 1585-1589; 2219). 
1A true and correct copy of the district court's Memorandum Decision is attached as 
Addendum A. 
5 
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II. Statement of Facts. 
1. RSC was the general contractor for a Planned Unit Development (PUD) 
known as the Orchard Vista P.U.D., (the "Project"). (Record 833) 
2. Orchard Vista was the owner of the real property on which the Project was 
built and was the developer of the Project. Orchard Vista, through its engineers and 
surveyors, decided where to locate the buildings on the Project and was responsible for 
the development of the property, the building plans and "staking out" the buildings on the 
Project. (Record 1048-1051, 1070-1077, 1101 - 1102, 1104-1111) 
3. RSC entered into a subcontract with R.M. Rees Construction, ("Rees") to 
perform certain stucco work for the Project. (Record 833-834) 
4. RSC entered into a subcontract with John Clayton Construction, wherein 
JCC was to perform certain siding, soffitt and fascia work on the Project. (Record 834) 
5. Gonzalez was an employee of JCC. (Record 834) 
6. RSC contracted with its subcontractors to perform specific construction 
related duties and services on the Project. Each subcontractor was responsible for the 
oversight and supervision of their workers. Additionally, each subcontractor controlled 
the overall method and manner concerning how the subcontractor performed its work. 
(Record 834) 
7. On June 22, 2007, JCC sent Gonzalez and other workers to install soffit and 
fascia on the north wall of the fourth and final building on the Project. (Record 836) 
6 
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8. JCC and its employees were the only subcontractors present and working 
on building four on the date of the accident. RSC was not present at the jobsite and was 
unaware of JCC's employees presence on the Project, on June 22, 2007. (Record 836) 
9. In performing his soffit and fascia work on the north wall of building four, 
Gonzalez utilized scaffolding that was owned by Rees. (Record 836) 
10. Prior to the accident Gonzalez did not have any discussions with Rees or 
RSC about whether or not it would be okay or safe to use the scaffolding. (Record 837) 
11. Gonzalez climbed Rees' scaffolding with his tools and four sections of 
aluminum J channel material. (Record 837-838) 
12. While on Rees' scaffolding, the Plaintiff was evidently electrically shocked 
when a 12 foot piece of aluminum J channel came in contact with a 7200 volt power line. 
(Record 838) 
13. It is undisputed that apart from scheduling and coordinating Rees' work on 
the Project, RSC did not exercise affirmative control over the method or manner in which 
Rees' performed the stucco work on the Project. Additionally, it is undisputed that RSC 
did not exercise affirmative control over the method or manner in which Rees' erected 
scaffolding on the Project. (Record 838 - 839). 
14. Additionally, it is undisputed that RSC did not exercise affirmative control 
over the method and manner in which JCC supervised its employees (including Gonzalez) 
or over the safety equipment JCC employees utilized when JCC performed the siding, 
7 
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soffit and fascia work on the Project. Furthermore, it is undisputed that apart from 
scheduling and coordinating JCC's work on the Project, RSC did not exercise affirmative 
control over the method or manner in which JCC or Gonzalez performed the siding, soffit 
and fascia work on the Project. (Record 839 - 840). 
15. Nowhere in Gonzalez' original Complaint or his Amended Complaint does 
Gonzalez allege that RSC owned or possessed the property. However, both in the 
original Complaint and the Amended Complaint Gonzalez correctly alleges that Orchard 
Vista was at all relevant times the owner and developer of the property where the Project 
was located. (Record 1 - 10; 126 - 134) 
16. RSC was not responsible for the placement of building four and its 
proximity to the power lines. (Record 1048 - 1051, 1070 - 1077, 1101 - 1102, 1104 -
1111) 
17; On or about April 9, 2010, RSC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
against the Plaintiff. In support of its summary judgment motion RSC argued that Utah 
law clearly establishes that, as the general contractor on the Project, RSC cannot be held 
liable for the workplace injury of a subcontractor's employee unless RSC exercised 
affirmative control over the injury causing aspect of the work. (Record 627 - 637). 
18. In its opposition to RSC's motion for summary judgment, Gonzalez 
claimed that RSC was "directly negligent" as Gonzalez' claims against RSC were, in fact, < 
"premises liability" claims. Gonzalez' "premises liability" argument was not based on 
8 
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RSC's ownership or possession of the property; rather, Plaintiff argued that pursuant to 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384, RSC, as the general contractor, is subject to the 
same liability as an owner of land in a premises liability case. (Record 825 - 851) 
19. A hearing on RSC's motion for summary judgment was held before the 
honorable Joseph C Fratto on July 21, 2010. (Record 1564). 
20. For the first time at oral argument Gonzalez referenced non-binding 
decisions made by other Utah District Courts and offered copies of the same to this Court 
and counsel for RSC. Neither the Trial Court nor counsel for RSC accepted the copies 
offered by Gonzalez's counsel. Notwithstanding the same, on July 21, 2010, Plaintiffs 
counsel mailed copies of the referenced decisions to this Court ex parte. (Record 1573 -
1584) .. 
21. On July 30, 2010, RSC formally objected to Gonzalez's counsel's attempt 
to submit additional argument ex parte and without leave of Court in violation of Utah R. 
Civ. P. 7(c)(1) and requested the Court to strike the same. (Record 1573 - 1584) 
22. Notwithstanding RSC's Objection and Motion to Strike Gonzalez's 
Supplemental Argument, on July 30, 2010, the trial court issued a Memorandum 
Decision, denying RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Memorandum Decision 
the trial court ruled: 
After reviewing the record in this matter, including consideration of 
plaintiffs claim of "possessor liability," which in light of Utah's 
liberal pleading standards, is appropriate, the Court is not persuaded 
summary judgment can be granted in the instant. Indeed, while no 
9 
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Utah Court has explicitly adopted this section of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, such a theory of liability has not been rejected by 
the Courts in Utah and indeed, it has been continuously adopted in 
other jurisdictions. Moreover, although not binding precedent, other 
district courts in Utah have also been persuaded of its applicability.2 
Applied to the facts of this case, the Court finds it sensible to conclude 
that when an owner relinquishes control of property to a general 
contractor, that contractor must be responsible for any conditions it 
creates on the property, specifically in this matter, the constructing of 
a building and its resulting conditions. In sum, the Court agrees with 
Plaintiff and concludes that § 384 reflects sound policy and should be 
applied in the instant. 
(Record 1587-1588). 
23. Contrary to the District Court's Memorandum Decision, Orchard Vista, not 
RSC, was responsible for the location and placement of building four on the Project and 
its proximity to the power line. Gonzalez has expressly asserted premises liability claims 
against Orchard Vista in his Amended Complaint and his premises liability claims against 
Orchard Vista are still pending. (Record 1048 - 1051, 1070 - 1077, 1101 - 1102, 1104 -
1111) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court has accepted RSC petition for interlocutory appeal to review the trial 
court's denial of RSCs Motion for Summary Judgment. Notwithstanding the fact that it 
was undisputed that RSC did not participate in or control the manner in which Gonzalez's 
work was performed and was not present at the Project on the day Gonzalez was injured, 
2
 Copies of the District Court Opinions referenced by the trial court are provided as 
Addendum B. 
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the trial court denied RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment. In denying RSC's Motion 
for Summary Judgment the trial court erred in two respects. 
First, the trial court erred when it applied landowner liability upon RSC based 
solely upon RSC's status as the general contractor for the Project. In Utah, "the general 
rule is that 'the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm 
caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.' " Begaye v Big 
D Construction, 2008 UT 4 f 8, 178 P.3d 343. (quoting, Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22 \ 
13). Utah law further recognizes "...that one who hires an independent contractor and 
does not participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed 
owes no duty of care concerning the safety or the manner or method of performance 
implemented." Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22 ^ 13. An exception to this general rule 
only arises "when an employer 'participate^] in or controls] the manner in which the 
contractor's work is performed.' " Begaye v Big D Construction, 2008 UT 4 f^ 8. This 
exception is known as the "retained control doctrine." Id. 
However, the trial court ruled as a matter of law that the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 384, imposed landowner liabilities upon RSC, notwithstanding the fact that 
Restatement § 384 has never been adopted by a Utah appellate court and is inconsistent 
with established Utah precedent concerning a general contractors liability and the retained 
control doctrine. The trial court's adoption of Restatement § 384 and the expanded and 
onerous duties that accompany § 384 undermine and eviscerate established Utah law. As 
11 
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will be demonstrated below, the trial court's adoption of Restatement § 384 is contrary to 
the holdings in virtually all of Utah's retained control cases that unequivocally state that a 
general contractor's basic responsibility to look for and correct dangerous working 
conditions is not enough to make it liable under circumstances where the general 
contractor does not exercise control over the injury causing aspect of the subcontractor's 
work. See, Magana, 2009 UT 49 ^ 29; Begaye, 2008 UT 4 f 5. Indeed, here Orchard 
Vista, the developer and landowner is a defendant in this case and Gonzalez has pursued 
his premises liability claims directly against Orchard Vista from the outset of this case. 
Because the trial court's adoption of § 384 is inconsistent with Utah law, and because the 
undisputed facts below demonstrate that RSC did not actively participate in the injury 
causing aspect of Gonzalez' work, RSC is entitled to a reversal of the trial court's 
decision and the granting of summary judgment in RSC's favor. 
Second, the trial court erred when it ruled that Gonzalez properly plead a premises 
liability claim. Gonzalez' Amended Complaint is deficient in many respects and fails to 
give RSC notice that Gonzalez was asserting a premises liability argument against it. 
Indeed, Gonzalez' complaint fails to allege that RSC owned or possessed the property at 
issue. In Utah, a plaintiffs failure to allege ownership or possession of the location 
where a hazard is located is fatal to a plaintiffs premises liability claim. See, Hevelone v. 
City Market, Inc., 2005 Ut. App. 215, (Utah Ct. App.)(emphasis added). Moreover, 
Gonzalez first raised his premises liability claim in his Opposition to RSC's Motion for 
12 
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Summary Judgment. Because Gonzalez' novel premises liability claim is predicated 
upon the adoption of Restatement § 384, which has never been adopted by a Utah 
appellate court, Gonzalez failed to properly plead or otherwise give notice of his premises 
liability claim against RSC. 
Gonzalez' opposition relies upon a legal argument that has never been adopted in 
Utah and conflicts with firmly established Utah precedent. Indeed, Orchard Vista, not 
RSC was responsible for the location and placement of building four and its proximity to 
the power lines. Moreover, In Utah, a court will not consider a novel theory of recovery 
when it is raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment. 
Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 2008 UTApp. 315 \ 19, 193 P.3d 650. 
Consequently, the trial court's determination that Gonzalez adequately plead a premises 
liability claim is in error and should be reversed by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
L The trial court erred in applying the Restatement of Torts 
(Second) § 384 to the instant case as § 384 has not been adopted 
by Utah appellate courts, is inconsistent with prior Utah case 
law, and is incompatible with Utah's general rule of non-liability. 
Utah has long established a general rule that "the employer of an independent 
contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the 
contractor or his servants." Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22 |^ 13, 979 P.2d 322 (emphasis 
added). As will be demonstrated below, RSC is entitled to summary judgment on 
Gonzalez' negligence claims because it is undisputed that RSC, in its coordination and 
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scheduling of the Project, did not retain control over the method or manner that Gonzalez 
or his employer JCC performed their work. Indeed, the Plaintiff conceded that JCC 
employees alone determined the methods, manner and materials they used and had 
complete autonomy over the injury causing aspect of the work. Gonzalez argued to the 
trial court that RSC owed duties to Gonzalez under a premises liability theory that is 
contrary to established Utah law and has never been adopted by a Utah appellate court. 
The trial court erred in considering Gonzalez' premises liability argument and unless the 
trial court's order is reversed now, in the future RSC and other general contractors, will 
be subject to expanded legal duties and liabilities not previously recognized under Utah 
law and which conflict with Utah's well established retained control doctrine. 
In Utah, "the general rule is that 'the employer of an independent contractor is not 
liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his 
servants.' " Begaye v Big D Construction, 2008 UT 4 ^ 8, 178 P.3d 343. (quoting, 
Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22 f^ 13). For ease of reference, RSC will refer to the above 
stated principle as "the general rule of non-liability." As pointed out by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Magana v. Dave Roth Construction, 2009 UT 45, 215 P.3d 143, the 
general rule of non-liability "...recognizes that one who hires an independent contractor 
and does not participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is 
performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety or the manner or method of 
performance implemented." Id. at f 22 (citing Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, f^ 
14 
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13)(emphasis added). An exception to this general rule only arises "when an employer 
'participate^] in or controls] the manner in which the contractor's work is performed.'" 
Begaye v Big D Construction, 2008 UT 4Tf8. This exception to the general rule of non-
liability is known as the "retained control doctrine." Id. 
It is undisputed that Gonzalez was injured while installing soffit and fascia on the 
north side of building four. See, Record 836. It is further undisputed that Gonzalez' 
employer, JCC, was responsible for supervising its employees, was responsible for the 
safety equipment its employees utilized, and had complete control over the method and 
manner in which it performed its work on the Project. See, Record 839 - 840. Also, it is 
undisputed that RSC was not responsible for the placement of the buildings because 
Orchard Vista, the owner and developer, determined the location of the buildings on the 
Project and their proximity to the power lines. See, Record 1048 - 1051. Finally, it is 
undisputed that Gonzalez and his co-workers were the only workers present at building 
four on the date of his accident; consequently, RSC could not have directly contributed to 
Gonzalez' accident. See, Record 836. Because it is undisputed that RSC did not 
participate in or control the manner in which Gonzalez' work was performed, the retained 
control exception does not apply and RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment should have 
been granted as a matter of law. 
Faced with the undisputed facts that RSC was not liable for Gonzalez's injuries, 
Gonzalez attempted to re-characterize his claims against RSC as "direct negligence" 
15 
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claims similar to those asserted by the Plaintiff in Magana v. Dave Roth Construction, 
2009 UT 45 lj 38, 215 P.3d 143. However, unlike the defendant in Magana, the 
undisputed facts demonstrate that RSC was not present on the date of Plaintiff s accident 
and therefore could not have directly contributed to Gonzalez' accident in the manner 
described in Magana. Given undisputed facts that RSC did not participate in the injury 
causing aspect of the work, Gonzalez argued for the first time in his opposition to RSC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment that RSC was liable under a premises liability analysis. 
Specifically, Gonzalez claims that his direct negligence claims are, "based upon the Utah 
Supreme Court's seminal opinion in Hale v. Beckstead, which applied premises liability 
negligence principles to claims by subcontractors." See, Record at 826 - 827. 
However, because the defendant general contractor in Beckstead was also the 
property owner and thus fit the definition of "possessor of land" under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 343 and 343 A, the Beckstead case is readily distinguishable. See, 
Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24 ffij 7, 8, 9, 116 P.3d 263. Unlike the general contractor in 
Beckstead, RSC was not the owner or a "possessor of land"; consequently, §§ 343 and 
343A did not apply and Gonzalez was required to base his premises liability theory on 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384, a provision that has never been adopted by a Utah 
appellate court. In sum, the only "direct negligence" claims articulated by the Gonzalez 
against RSC are based upon a premises liability theory that creatively splices selected 
elements of Beckstead with Restatement § 384, a section that has not been adopted in 
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Utah and is incompatible with Utah's general rule of non-liability and Utah's case law on 
the retained control doctrine. 
The trial court's acceptance of Gonzalez' novel argument and its adoption of 
Restatement § 384 has significant ramifications not only for RSC in the instant case, but 
for the entire construction industry in Utah. The trial court's conclusion that "§ 384 
reflects sound policy and should be applied in the instant" ignores the fact that 
Restatement § 384 is inconsistent with Utah's general rule of non-liability for general 
contractors. Simply put, the adoption of Restatement § 384 would destroy any future 
application of the general rule of non-liability and the retained control doctrine. 
By its very nature, nearly all construction sites will, at various times, contain 
dangerous conditions. If Gonzalez' argument is adopted, the basis for Utah appellate 
decisions in retained control cases would be severely undermined as future Plaintiffs 
would only have to allege that general contractors or other subcontractors on a project 
owed workers on the site the same premises liability duties as a landowner. According to 
the trial court in the instant case this expansive and onerous duty would include a duty to 
warn subcontractors of all known or knowable dangers. This result would dramatically 
broaden the responsibilities and liabilities of not only general contractors, but would 
dramatically expand the liabilities of each and every trade on a construction project with 
the exception of one, the employer of the injured worker. 
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Indeed, Utah law has long recognized that the employer of the injured worker has 
the most knowledge of the work to be performed, the risks inherent in the same and is in 
the best position to assess and control the safety precautions for its employees. However, 
due to the exclusive remedy provision of Utah's Workers Compensation Act, the 
expanded responsibilities and liabilities advocated by Gonzalez would not increase the 
responsibilities and liabilities of the employer of the injured worker. 
Both workers compensation carriers and the injured worker have an incentive to 
find a third party to whom fault may be shifted. There is no doubt that the workers 
compensation carriers actively seek the recovery of benefits they pay to employees 
through the use of subrogation. Further, there is no doubt that injured workers actively 
seek to obtain larger common law damages above and beyond the no-fault benefits 
provided by workers compensation. As a result the theory advanced by Gonzalez would 
be used to circumvent the retained control doctrine and would create a perverse incentive 
for workers compensation carriers as well as the injured worker and his employer to shift 
the burden of worksite safety to the general contractor who was not in control of the 
injury causing aspect of the work. While the theory advanced by Gonzalez would 
provide injured workers and workers compensation carriers an "end-around" the retained 
control doctrine and provide, it would serve to undermine rather than promote worksite 
safety. 
18 
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The district court's blanket adoption of Restatement § 384 is contrary to the 
holdings in virtually all of Utah's retained control cases that unequivocally state that a 
general contractor's responsibility to look for and correct dangerous working conditions 
is not enough to make it liable. See, Magana, 2009 UT 49 f 29; Martinez v. Jacobsen 
Constr. Co., Inc., 2005 WL 615106 (Utah Ct App.)(unpublished decision); Begaye, 2008 
UT 4 Tf 5. Indeed, to hold otherwise would mean that a general contractor could 
subcontract for the performance of work but not successfully delegate the safety 
responsibility that normally accompanies that work. Logic and public policy dictate that 
safety responsibility best rests on the subcontractor doing the work, for the subcontractor 
is the entity most knowledgeable and familiar with its work and its particular hazards. 
Because RSC did not own or possess the property, the Plaintiff was required to 
base his premises liability argument upon the Restatement § 384 which states: 
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or 
creates any other condition thereon is subject to the same liability, and 
enjoys the same immunity from liability, as though he were the 
possessor of the land, for bodily harm caused to others within and 
without the land, while the work is in his charge, by the dangerous 
character of the structure or other condition. 
(emphasis added). A copy of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384 is attached as 
Addendum C. 
In Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, the seminal case articulating the retained control 
doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court examined other similar Restatement provisions in the 
context of a general contractor's liability to an injured employee of a subcontractor. The 
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Utah Supreme Court in Thompson refused to apply three sections of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts as exceptions to the retained control doctrine: y 
We agree with Privette and Wagner and decline to apply section 413, 
416, or 427 of the Restatement in the manner Thompson proposes. 
Whether based on direct negligence under section 413 or vicarious 
liability under sections 416 and 427, these provisions have no application 
when the injured person is an employee of the independent contractor 
undertaking the allegedly dangerous work. The majority of jurisdictions 
that have examined this issue have decided likewise. 
Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22 f^ 30. Just as the Utah Supreme Court declined an 
invitation to eviscerate the retained control doctrine with the adoption of §§413,416 and 
427, RSC requests this Court to make the same sound public policy determination and not 
extend §384 to claims made by injured employees of subcontractors against general 
contractors or other subcontractors. 
Of particular note, pursuant to the holding in Thompson the phrase "to others", 
which appears in §§ 413, 416 and 427 which the Utah Supreme Court declined to adopt 
as well as § 384 which was adopted by the trial court in the instant case, does not apply to 
the subcontractor's employees tasked with carrying out the work. Thompson, 979 P.2d at 
330 (Utah 1999)(uIn addition, sections 413, 416, and 427 each speak of liability for injury 
"to others," which implies third parties rather than employees of the independent 
contractor carrying out the contracted work."Xemphasis added)). Consequently, the trial 
court's application of § 384 to the Plaintiff, an employee of the independent contractor 
carrying out the contracted work, is in error. 
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While Gonzalez argued that Hale v. Beckstead 2005 UT 24, 116 P.2d 263, was 
dispositive, Gonzalez could not achieve his desired result without creatively relying on 
selected portions of Beckstead coupled with Restatement§ 384, a provision that has not 
been adopted by Utah appellate courts. Contrary to Gonzalez' representations otherwise, 
Beckstead, standing alone, does not support Plaintiffs premises liability theory because 
the defendant in Beckstead was a property owner acting as his own general contractor. 
Beckstead, 2005 UT 24 ffif 7, 8, 9, 116 P.3d 263. Consequently, as "an invitee on 
Beckstead's land" the Plaintiff in Beckstead had enjoyed "a status wholly separate from 
any status he may have had as an independent contractor." Beckstead, UT App 240, f^ 11 
n.2. Gonzalez' theory of premises liability is best described as a hybrid of elements of 
Beckstead coupled with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384 which has not been 
adopted by Utah Appellate Courts. 
Notwithstanding Gonzalez' attempts to normalize and accredit his theory, 
Gonzalez cannot escape the fact that no other Utah appellate decision has ever held that a 
general contractor that does not concurrently own the premises at issue stands in the same 
shoes as a landowner for premises liability purposes. While acknowledging that Utah has 
not adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384, Gonzalez claims that "it is unaware of 
jurisdiction that has rejected section 384." See, Record 843. In support of this assertion, 
Gonzalez provides a string cite from an unreported decision that purports "at least twenty-
one other states.. .have followed the common law rule contained in §384." See, Record at 
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843 - 844. (citing Smithey v. Stueve Constr, Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3871, 14-16 
(D.S.D. January 18, 2007). 
A review of the cases cited in Gonzalez' string cite from Smithey, demonstrate an 
important distinguishing feature. Specifically the overwhelming majority of cases 
contained in the string cite did not involve an employee of a subcontractor, as in this case. 
Rather the majority of the cases in the string cite involved third parties such as infants, 
children or other members of the public.3 Indeed, the case that contained the misleading 
3 , • • > . • • 
DeVazierv. Whit Davis Lumber Co, 257 Ark. 371,516 S.W.2d 610 (Ark. 1974)( 13-year-old 
girl suffered personal injuries when stack of sheetrock fell on her legs as she and her mother 
were inspecting a house for purchase); Broadway v. Blythe Industries, Inc., 313 N.C. 150, 
326 S.E.2d 266 (N.C. 1985)(Action for injuries to trespassing child injured on a construction 
site); Duggan v. Esposito, 178 Conn. 156, 422 A.2d 287 (Conn., 1979)(Action for injuries 
to a child that ran into pipes protruding from defendant subcontractors' truck parked in 
driveway on owner's premises); Cockerham v. R. E. Vaughan, Inc., 82 So.2d 
890 (Fla.l955)(Action for injuries to an infant who fell into a hole existing on the land of 
another and dug by the defendant contractor for the installation of a septic tank); 
Chronopoulos v. Gil Wyner Co., 334 Mass. 593, 137 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. 1956)(Action for 
injuries sustained by minor who fell from temporary bridge across trench excavated by 
subcontractor); Barnett By and Through Barnett v. Equality Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Inc., 62 
S.W.2d 924 (Mo.App. E.D. 1983)(Action for injuries sustained by minor for injuries 
sustained when he climbed stack of cement bumper blocks used in parking lots to delineate 
parking spaces); Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 23 N.J.Super. 9, 92 A.2d 
498 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1952)(Action for injuries to a child who fell from high to low ground 
level before bulldozing operation had been completed); Cook v. Demetrakas, 108 R.I. 397, 
275 A.2d 919 (R.L 1971 )(Action for injuries incurred by policeman against property owners, 
their corporate tenant and construction company which was doing excavation work on the 
premises when policeman fell over embankment on the property while pursuing a fugitive 
after responding to a request from a third party at another address); Mile High Fence Co. v. 
Radovich, 175 Colo. 537,489 P.2d308 (Colo. 1971)(supersededbystatute)(Actionbypolice 
officer against fence company for injuries sustained when he stepped into post hole on 
property abutting alley); Savoie v. Littleton Const. Co., 95 N.H. 67, 57 A.2d 
772 (N.H.1948)(Action for injuries sustained by driver of auto that collided with the 
defendant's equipment on a new highway in process of construction); Elliott v. Rogers 
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string cite, Smithey v. Stueve Constr. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3871, 14-16 (D.S.D. 
January 18, 2007), is an unreported decision that, similar to the many cases it cited in 
support, involved a third party member of the public rather than an employee of a 
subcontractor as in this case. 
Contrary to Gonzalez' claims otherwise, other states have considered and rejected 
Gonzalez' premises liability argument. In Branum v. Petro-Hunt Corp., 2010 WL 
1977963, (Dist. N.D. 2010), a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a report and 
recommendation to the District Court, denying on futility grounds, defendant Petro-
Hunt's motion to add plaintiffs employer as a third-party defendant. The Branum Court 
reviewed the allegations of the Plaintiffs complaint, including Count I, a premises 
Const, Inc., 257 Or. 421,479 P.2d 753 (Or. 1971)(Action for wrongful death resulting from 
a collision that involved a job site worker six to eight miles from job site and one half four 
before work was to start, had not entered upon his duties and was performing no act for 
benefit of his employer; consequently, employer was not liable for decedent's death under 
doctrine of respondeat superior); Hollett v. Dundee, Inc. 272 F.Supp. 1 (D.C.Del. 
1967)(Action for injuries incurred by janitor against contractor and subcontractor when he 
fell into ditch); Kragel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 537 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 1995)(Customer 
sued store owner after customer fell on snow and ice which had accumulated in store parking 
lot); Von Dollen v. Stulgies, 111 Neb. 5, 128 N.W.2d 115 (Neb.l964)(Landownerfs sister 
who visited home under construction as owner's guest solely to accompany and assist owner 
and who had no contract with or authority over builder was 'licensee' as to builder and was 
not entitled to recover from builder for injury received when wallboard fell on her foot, in 
absence of showing that builder or any of his employees were on premises on day of accident 
or had knowledge of placement of wallboard); Williamson v. Allied Group, Inc., Ill 
Wash.App. 451, 72 P.3d 230 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2003)(Action for injuries incurred by 
Tenant who was injured when she slipped and fell on unimproved grassy slope between 
parking lot and apartment building); Yee Chuck v. Board of Trustees ofLeland Stanford Jr. 
University, 179 Cal.App.2d 405, 3 Cal.Rptr. 825 (Cal.App.l960)(Action against university 
by sublessee related to conditions created on the land by the contractor). 
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liability claim premised upon Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, a Restatement 
provision expressly relied upon by Plaintiff in the instant action. Citing prior North 
Dakota precedent, the Branum Court stated: 
When a person having control of a premises employs an independent 
contractor to conduct work and a claim is brought against that person, 
the more specific provisions of Restatement of Torts 2d §§ 414, 416. 
and 427 govern with respect to a claim of a failure to provide a safe 
place to work-at least when the claim is brought by an employee of an 
independent contractor. 
Id. at 3. (emphasis added). 
The Branum Court cited and quoted at length from a North Dakota Supreme Court 
decision Petchel v. Conoco, Inc., 567 N.W. 2d 455 (N.D. 1994). Because its analysis is 
instructive and directly correlates with established Utah law, the Petchel decision, as cited 
by the court in Branum, is quoted here at length: 
Relying on Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Tel Co., 23 N.D. 6, 135 N.W. 
793 (1912), the Pechtls also contend Conoco had a non-delegable duty 
regarding conditions at the worksite. They argue Conoco retained 
exclusive possession and control of the worksite and could not shift its 
duty to provide a safe workplace to Steier. 
To the extent the Pechtls' argument is premised upon Conocofs control 
of the worksite, it is governed by our resolution of the issue of 
retained control under Section 414. The Pechtls1 reliance on Ruehl is 
also misplaced. In Ruehl, a young child died when he fell into a 
telephone post hole dug by a person employed by the defendant, a 
telephone company. In discussing the telephone company's duty, this 
court said: **** 
[quotation omitted] 
Ruehl involved the existence of a hazardous condition, an unguarded 
hole in the ground in which a child fell. Here, the employee of an 
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independent contractor is claiming an injury caused by a hazardous or 
dangerous jobsite. In Fleck we recently considered a similar claim 
under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 416 and 427. We 
distinguished between members of the general public injured by 
worksite negligence and injured employees of an independent 
contractor, and we held an employer of an independent contractor is 
not vicariously liable to the independent contractor's employees for 
inherent dangers or peculiar risks at a jobsite under Sections 416 and 
427. To the extent the Pechtls1 argument is based upon language in 
Ruehl about a dangerous condition like a deep pit or well our decision 
in Fleck4 is dispositive of a claim by an employee of the independent 
contractor. 
Id. at 3-4. {quoting, Pechtl v. Conoco, Inc., 567 N.W.2d 813, 818 - 819 (N.D.1997) 
(emphasis added). 
The result in Pechtl and its progeny directly correlates with established Utah law 
as articulated in Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22. Rather than adopt Gonzalez5 argument 
which misapplies and incorporates Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343, 343 A, and (the 
un-adopted) § 384, the more practical and reasoned approach, as demonstrated in Pechtl 
and Thompson, would be to analyze this case pursuant to the more specific provisions §§ 
413, 414, 416, and 427. Regarding the same, for reasons virtually identical to the North 
Dakota Supreme Court in Pechtl, the Utah Supreme Court in Thompson declined to adopt 
§§ 413, 416 and 427 when the person injured was an employee of a subcontractor who 
was covered by workers compensation: 
The purpose of these sections is "to ensure that innocent third parties 
injured by the negligence of an independent contractor hired by a 
Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445, 449-54 (N.D.1994), is cited with 
approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, f 30 at fn.4. 
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landowner to do inherently dangerous work on the land would not 
have to depend on the contractor's solvency in order to receive 
compensation for the injuries." Privette, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 
at 725. Privette held that this purpose is not advanced when these 
exceptions are applied in favor of a contractor's employees who are 
covered by workers' compensation. See id. 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 
P.2d at 726-30; see also Wagner, 421 N.W.2d at 840-44 (detailing 
reasons for not adopting sections 413, 416, and 427 in favor of 
employees of independent contractors). 
We agree with Privette and Wagner and decline to apply section 413, 
416, or 427 of the Restatement in the manner Thompson proposes. 
Whether based on direct negligence under section 413 or vicarious 
liability under sections 416 and 427. these provisions have no 
application when the injured person is an employee of the independent 
contractor undertaking the allegedly dangerous work. The majority of 
jurisdictions that have examined this issue have decided likewise5. 
See, Id. % SO atfn. 4 citing: Morris v. City ofSoldotna, 553 P.2d 474,481 -82 (Alaska 1976); 
Welter v. Kennecott Copper Co., 1 Ariz.App. 395,403 P.2d 330,337-39 (1965); Jackson v. 
Petit Jean Elec. Coop., 270 Ark. 506,606 S.W.2d66,69 {19^); Privette, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 
854 P.2d at 726-31; Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660, 548 A.2d 461,466 (1988); Peone 
v. Regulus Stud Mills, 113 Idaho 374, 744 P.2d 102, 105-06 (1987); Johns v. New York 
Blower Co., 442 N.E.2d 382, 386-88 (Ind.Ct.App.1982); Dillardv. Strecker, 255 Kan. 704, 
877 P.2d 371,385 (1994); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659,661-63 
(Ky.1973); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 16 Md.App. 590, 547 A.2d 1080, 1082-83 
(1988); Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 392 Mass. 165,466 N.E.2d 500, 502-03 (1984); Zueckv. 
Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d384,390 (Mo. 1991) (en banc); Sierra Pacific 
Power Co. v. Rinehart, 99 Nev. 557,665 P.2d270,273-74 (1983); Donch v. Delta Inspection 
Services, Inc., 165 N.J.Super. 567,398 A.2d 925,927-29 (1979); New Mexico Electric Serv. 
Co. v. Montanez, 89 N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634, 637-38 (1976); Whitaker v. Norman, 75 
N.Y.2d 779,552 N.Y.S.2d 86, 551 N.E.2d 579, 580 (1989); Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification 
Co., 522N.W.2d445,449-54(N.D.I994); Curless v. Lathrop Co., 65 Ohio App.3d377,583 
N.E.2d 1367,1376-78 (1989); Cooper v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson 
County, 628 S.W.2d 30,32-33 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1981); Humphreys v. Texas Power & Light Co., 
421 S.W.2d 324,330-31 (Tex.Civ.App. 1968); Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 
96 Wash.2d 274, 635 P.2d 426, 428-31 (1981) (en banc); Wagner, 421 N.W.2d at 839-44; 
Stockwellv. Parker Drilling Co., 733 P.2d 1029, 1031-33 (Wyo.1987). 
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i£/.atffl[29,30. 
It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court in Thompson examined the 
defendant's liability both on "vicarious liability" claims as well as "direct liability" claims 
and along with 22 other states, rejected the Plaintiffs attempt to apply these provisions to 
an employee of an independent contractor who was covered by workers compensation.6 
The Thompson Court further examined the policy implications and the "unfair and 
anomalous results" that would occur if Restatement of Torts 2d. §§ 413, 416 and 427 
applied to injured employees of subcontractors after taking into consideration Utah's 
workers' compensation system. The Thompson Court concluded that the adoption of an 
argument similar to the Plaintiffs in this case would (1) "exempt a single class of 
employees, those who work for independent contractors, from the statutorily mandated 
limits of workers' compensation"; (2) would allow a recovery of tort damages that is 
greater than the damages incurred by the injured employee's employer which are limited 
to its workers compensation premiums; and (3) would result in a reallocation of damages 
as a contractor would be held exclusively liable for a subcontractor's employee's injuries 
because the workers compensation insurer is entitled to complete reimbursement from 
any damages obtained by the injured employee. Id. at % 32. The "unfair and anomalous 
6 
Gonzalez' workers compensation coverage is not in dispute as Gonzalez filed a Motion for 
Leave to File Second Amended Complaint wherein Plaintiff seeks to have Workers 
Compensation Fund added as a named co-plaintiff to this action. Record at 1600 - 1618. 
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results" articulated in Thompson are present in the instant case and further argue against 
the Plaintiffs unwarranted attempt to expand Utah law. 
Following Thompson, injured workers and workers compensation carriers have 
creatively sought several different theories to circumvent the same. However, as 
demonstrated above, when the Utah Supreme Court decided Thompson, ample 
consideration was given to the interplay between Utah's Workers Compensation Act and 
the incentive inherent in the same for injured workers and the workers compensation 
carrier to shift liability to other parties. The Plaintiffs argument, if adopted by this Court, 
would result in a dramatic and unprecedented expansion of a general contractor's liability 
and would serve to undermine rather than promote worksite safety. The reasoning 
rejecting the expansive liability advocated by Gonzalez was articulated in Thompson is 
sound and is applicable to this case: 
As expounded in Zneck, if employees of an independent contractor are 
allowed to avail themselves of the peculiar risk doctrine or inherently 
dangerous work exception, the principal employer is placed in an 
untenable position: he or she must anticipate activities that are 
"inherently dangerous " to the contractor's employees and, if the dangers 
inhere to the manner in which the work is done, protect against such 
dangers despite the fact that the employees are best able to identify and 
address whatever hazards are involved in their own method of 
performance. Oftentimes, both the risks involved and the protections 
necessary to avoid the risks are beyond the principal employer's 
knowledge or capacity. Thus, to avoid the liability imposed by the 
peculiar risk doctrine or inherently dangerous work exception, the 
principal employer has an incentive to direct his or her own employees 
to do the work despite their lack of expertise. Such a choice would limit 
the principal employer's exposure to that under the Workers' 
Compensation Act but, at the same time, increase the risk of injury to the 
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principal's employees and innocent third parties. Placing principal 
employers in such a position distorts the objectives of tort law, and for 
that reason, the peculiar risk doctrine or inherently dangerous work 
exception should not apply in favor of employees of the independent 
contractor performing the work. See Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 387-88. 
Id. at 31. (emphasis added). 
Gonzalez5 argument that a general contractor, standing in the shoes of a 
landowner, owes a non-delegable duty to its subcontractors to make the premises 
reasonably safe and to warn of all known or knowable dangers places an onerous duty 
upon the general contractor that has been rejected implicitly by Utah courts. Utah 
appellate courts have consistently held that a general contractor's responsibility to look 
for and correct dangerous working conditions is not enough to make it liable. See, 
Magana v. Dave Roth Construction, 2009 UT 49 j^ 29; Martinez v. Jacobs en Constr. Co., 
Inc., 2005 WL 615106 (Utah Ct. App.)(unpublished decision); Begaye, 2008 UT 4 f 5. 
Undoubtedly, the results in the aforementioned cases would be nullified by the adoption 
of Gonzalez'argument. 
Undoubtedly, this unprecedented expansion of liability would, for the reasons 
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Thopmson, not serve the noble goal to increase 
workplace safety, but instead would place general contractors in the untenable position of 
having to anticipate all of the dangers for all of the different trades on a construction 
project, even if those potential dangers are beyond the general contractors knowledge and 
capacity. While a general contractor relies upon an independent subcontractor to perform 
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a task due to the independent contractor's expertise, training and specialized knowledge, 
the adoption of the Plaintiffs argument would place the general contractor in the position 
to "to direct his or her own employees to do the work despite their lack of expertise." 
Thompson, at \ 31. Such a result would result in more workplace accidents and would 
serve to undermine, rather than promote, workplace safety. Consequently, Gonzalez' 
premises liability argument, while beneficial to Gonzalez, would ultimately make Utah 
construction projects less safe and should be explicitly rejected by this Court. 
II. The trial court erred by allowing Gonzalez to argue for the first 
time in his opposition that Gonzalez' claims against RSC were 
based in premises liability. 
The trial court erred when it allowed Gonzalez to argue for the first time in his 
opposition that his claims against RSC were based in premises liability. Although Utah 
pleading requirements are liberally construed, in a recent Utah Supreme Court case, the 
Supreme Court refused to allow a Plaintiff to argue for the first time in her opposition to a 
summary judgment, a new theory of causation when the Plaintiff failed to give notice to 
the parties of the same, "[t]he issue before us is to what extent a causation theory 
articulated for the first time in the context of a summary judgment motion must have 
appeared in prior pleadings in order to command consideration from the district court." 
See, Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33 (Utah 2010). 
In Gudmundson, the Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she was injured from 
"ozone overexposure." Id. at \ 40. However, when faced with a motion for summary 
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judgment, the Plaintiff alleged in her opposition that her injuries were the result of "ozone 
combined with other chemicals." Id. at f 41. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the 
Plaintiffs attempts to broaden her theory of recovery and held, "[Plaintiffs] failure to 
give appellees notice that she intended to pursue both theories precludes her from arguing 
that chemical toxicity caused her injuries." Id. 
The Gudmundson case is the most recent articulation of a well established legal 
principle. It is clear law in Utah that a court will not consider a novel theory of recovery 
when it is raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment. In 
AsaelFarr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 2008 UTApp. 315 \ 19, 193 P.3d 650, the 
court noted that "'[a] plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or 
theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment because such amendment fails to satisfy Utah's pleading 
requirements.'" (quoting Holmes Dev. LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38 f 31, 48 P.3d 895). The 
Asael Court affirmed the district court's refusal to consider the theory of "oral binder" 
when the plaintiff had not raised it prior to its opposition to motion for summary 
judgment because the case had been litigated for 3 years and the plaintiff had never raised 
it. Id. Similarly, the court in Holmes restricted the plaintiff to the allegations set forth in 
the complaint. See, Holmes, 2002 UT 38 % 3, 48 P.3d at 895. 
Moreover, in a case strikingly similar to this one, in Hevelone v. City Market, 
Inc., 2005 UT App. 215, (unpublished opinion), the Plaintiff failed to allege or raise any 
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inference that the Defendant, City Market, owned or possessed the property. The Utah 
Court of Appeals, held "Hevelone's failure to allege City Market's ownership or 
possession of the fire lane where the hazard was located is fatal to her premises liability 
claim." Id, 
In Gundrnundson, Asael, Holmes, and Helvelone, the Plaintiff failed to give notice 
or properly allege the theory of recovery sought. The Plaintiffs failure to do so in each 
case resulted the district court's proper disregarding of the same and dismissal of the 
unplead claims as the defendants were not given proper notice of the same. This case is 
no different. As in Gundmunson, Gonzalez only attempted to establish his new claim in 
the context of an opposition to summary judgment. As in Helvelone, Gonzalez' 
Amended Complaint failed to allege that RSC owned or possessed the property. Instead. 
Gonzalez' Amended Complaint correctly alleges that defendant Orchard Vista owned the 
property. See, Record 128 at ^f 12 - 13. Further, the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint 
cannot reasonably be construed to allege a premises liability claim against RSC. 
Even after the most generous reading of the Plaintiffs complaint, one cannot 
reasonably claim that it pleads premises liability against RSC. Plaintiffs counsel claims 
that the following two sub-paragraphs sufficiently plead a premises liability claim against 
RSC: 
27. Defendants breached their duty of care to Plaintiff by, among other 
things: 
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a. Failing to properly exercise and maintain a place of 
employment which was free from recognized hazards that were 
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to individuals 
working on the Property; 
* * * 
c. Failing to ensure that the development of the Property did not 
encroach upon the electrical lines lining the Property, or that proper 
safety measures regarding power lines were followed, including 
cutting off power to the electrical lines, insulating the electrical lines 
and protecting the 10 foot safety circle; 
First, if Gonzalez was asserting a premises liability argument against RSC, then 
Gonzalez' Amended Complaint was deficient as a matter of law. A plain reading of 
Gonzalez' Amended Complaint demonstrates that Gonzalez did not properly assert a 
premises liability action. As pointed out above, Gonzalez failed to even allege in his 
Amended Complaint that RSC owned or possessed the property. Rather, Gonzalez 
correctly alleged that another defendant, Orchard Vista, owned the property. In Utah, a 
plaintiffs failure to allege ownership or possession of the location where a hazard is 
located is fatal to a plaintiffs premises liability claim. See, Hevelone v. City Market, Inc., 
2005 Ut. App. 215, (Utah Ct. App.) This deficiency alone should have, as a matter of 
law, precluded the trial court from considering Plaintiffs premises liability argument. 
Second, Gonzalez argued that his claim against RSC was a premises liability claim 
based upon Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24. However, to establish premises liability 
duties upon RSC, Gonzalez could not and indeed did not, rely solely on Beckstead. 
Rather, Gonzalez had to first argue that Restatement § 384 placed RSC in the same shoes 
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as a landowner for premises liability purposes in order to apply Beckstead. The coupling 
of Restatement § 384 with Beckstead was necessary because Beckstead standing alone 
was readily distinguishable and inapplicable to this case. Unlike the instant case, the 
Plaintiff in Beckstead filed suit "alleging negligence based upon principles of premises 
liability." Id. at [^4 (emphasis added). Unlike the Plaintiff in Hale, Gonzalez' complaint 
is devoid of any reference to RSC's ownership or possession of the property. 
Furthermore, the general contractor in Hale was also the owner of the property acting as 
his own general contractor. Id. at ^ 3. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court did not 
analyze or base its holding in Beckstead upon the Restatement § 384. Instead the Utah 
Supreme Court analyzed the case based upon the defendant's own ownership and control 
of the property. Id at Tf 8. 
In sum, in order for RSC to have had notice that Gonzalez' claims against RSC 
were based in premises liability RSC would first have to overlook Gonzalez' failure 
properly plead that RSC had ownership or possession of the property. Second, RSC 
would have had to assume that its role as general contractor placed it in the same position 
as a property owner even though Utah law has never recognized that a general contractor 
ipso facto assumed the same liabilities as a landowner. Consequently, for RSC to have 
had notice of the premises liability claim, it would have to assume that Utah would at 
some future time adopt Restatement § 384 which would then arguably place RSC in the 
same position as a landowner. While Utah's pleading standards are liberal, they do not 
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require RSC to possess a crystal ball to determine prior to Gonzalez' opposition that he 
was asserting a premises liability claim. Clearly, this does not meet the minimum notice 
requirements for pleadings in Utah. Consequently, the trial court's determination that 
Gonzalez sufficiently plead a premises liability action against RSC should be overturned 
and RSC should be granted summary judgment as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law is clear that RSC, as the general contractor on the Project, cannot be 
liable for the workplace injury of Gonzalez unless RSC exercised affirmative control over 
the injury causing aspect of Gonzalez' work. Gonzalez' attempt to recast his claims 
against RSC as direct negligence and premises liability fail as a matter of law, as they are 
inconsistent and conflict with established Utah law. Utah has not adopted Restatement 
§384 and should not adopt it as it is in direct contravention of Utah's general rule of non-
liability. Because it is undisputed that RSC did not directly participate in Gonzalez' 
performance in the injury causing aspect of the work, the trial court erred in denying 
RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Further, Gonzalez' attempt to impose landowner premises liability duties upon 
RSC, fail as Gonzalez failed to properly plead or give notice of his premises liability 
claim until his opposing memorandum. Gonzalez failed to plead that RSC owned or 
possessed the property in question, which omission is fatal to Gonzalez' premises liability 
claim. 
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Based upon the foregoing, RSC respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
district court's decision and direct the district court to grant RSC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as a matter of law. 
{k 
DATED this ^&_ day of March, 2011. 
BERRETT & TAYLOiQL.C 
TIMOTHY J. CURTIS 
Attorneys for Defendant Russell 
Sorenkon(construction 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL. DISTRICT 
IN:AND.FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE M1. -GONZALEZ*. 
•• 'Plaintiff, 
v s , '[••' 
ORCHARD VISTA, LLC, PACIFICORP, 
an Oregon; corporation d/b/a 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER, R.M. REES 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah '. 
corporation d/b/a/ DESIGN STONE 
CREATIONS,. RUSSELL SORENSEN" 
CONSTRUCTION, a sole : 
proprietorship; JOHN DOE 
ENTITIES : 1-5.and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
PACIFICORP,.
 : . 
Third-Party .Plaintiff.,-. 
v . s . ' • • • • . • • 
JOHN CLAYTON CONSTRUCTION,'. 
INC., -
Third-Party Defendant 
MLBBDISTKISTXOURT 
Third Judlotat District 
JUL 3 0 2010 
Daputy Olerk 
"... MEMORANDUM pECISION 
Case No. 080921130 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO', JR. 
The 'above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant.to 
Russell S'prensen Construction's Motion for Summary -Judgment.. The 
Court heard oral argument with respect to the Motion on July 21, 
2010. Following the hearing, the motion was taken- under 
advisement. . ' .,•'.•''•'' . -
.The.iCourt having considered the motion,. memoranda, exhibits" 
attached thereto and for the good,cause shown, hereby enters the : 
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GONZALEZ v.--ORCHARD VISTA ST AL. • MEMORANDUM DECISION 
following ruling, 
.In support of its motion Rujaseil Sorensen Construction 
("RSC") argues Utah law is clear that as the; general contractor 
' •
 -
 . • • • 
on the project, RSC cannot be'iiable for the workplace.injury of 
a Johp Clayton Construction (tfJCC,f) employee unless RSC exercised 
affirmative;'control over the injury causing .aspect of the work, 
Moreover, -asserts RSC, plaintiffs attempts to recast its claims'. 
against RSC as direct negligence claims fail as it is undisputed 
that R3C did not directly participate in.JCC's performance in the 
injury causing aspect of the work and plaintiff \-.s • attempts to' 
impose landowner'liability fails as plaintiff failed to plead or 
give notice of this claim until the opposing, memoranda. Further, 
contends RSC, because Orchard Vista, LLC,.another defendant in 
this case, owned and possessed the property-and there is' no 
evidence ftSC owned' or possessed the property-plaintiff's claim of 
premises liability must fail. Finally, argues RSC, Utah has. not 
• ' i • • 
adopted Restatement § 38.4 and would not adopt it in this case as 
it "is in direct contravention of Utah's general rule of 
non-llabiiity,' . -.. 
..In opposition, plaintiff assertg he is bringing a claim of ' 
direct negligence, not vicarious, liability, and based upon the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Hale v-. .Beckstead 2005 UT 24, 
' • . .Page 2 .; 
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GONZALEZ v.; ORCHARD VISTA ET AL. . MEMORANDUM DECISION 
' . . '< • • ' • 
" . - ' • ' " :
 ;
- • • • I ' " ' • ' ' " ' 
I 33,- 116 -P. 3d. 263' (which applied premis.es liability negligence 
.principle^ to claims by Subcontractors),. a general contractor who 
" • ' : . • i • . . . ' • ' • • ' . " • ' 
assumes control of a site is a possessor of land and a' 
' • •• . i • • • ' • , ' - ' 
subcontractor's, employee is a business invitee. According to 
• • ' : • i . ' . . . ' -
i . 
plaintiffs tmder the Restatement, a possessor owes business 
invitees an'affirmative duty "not to create a'dangerous condition 
on the premises and owes a further duty to take reasonable.steps 
to-make'the premises .safe, .-..." 
;
 1 • "•'. • - . ' • • • 
In the present case, argues plaint if £.., RSC created a 
' . . ' • ' . | . - ' • 
dangerous; and unsafe condition by constructing- building ..No . 4, 
• • ' • • ' • • ' •
l
 ' • • " ' • • " -
which: contained Units 12 & "13, in violation of the. National 
Electrical-Safety-Code, which requires minimum vertical'and 
horizontal:clearance? to the high voltage power lines. The. 
problem was further compounded, asserts plaintiffr by the fact 
that RSC failed tp take reasonable steps to make the premises 
safe for subcontractors. '.. ' 
After;reviewing the record in this matter, including . 
consideration of plaintiff's\claim of "possessor liability,"' 
which in light of Utah's liberal, pleading standards-, is •' 
appropriate, the Jcourt is not. persuaded summary judgment can be 
granted ihithe instant, Indeed, while no. Utah Court has-
explicitly cidopte;d this section of the Restatement (Second), of 
' f • : " I • . 
I . Page 3 
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•GONZALEZ v, ORCHARD VISTA ET AI<,. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Torts, such a theory of liability has not been rejected by the 
Courts in^Utah and indeed, it has been continuously adopted in 
other jurisdictions. Moreover, although not binding precedent, 
district courts in Utah have also been persuaded of its • -. 
applicability. 
• Applied to rhe facts of this case;, the Court .-finds it 
.sensible to conclude that when an owner relinquishes control o f 
•property to a general contractor, that contractor must be 
responsible for any conditions"it creates on the property, 
specifically, in'this matter; the constructing of a building and 
its resulting conditions, In sum, the Court agrees with 
.Plaintiff and concludes that § 384 reflects sound policy and 
should be. applied in the instant, 
. This- said, disputed issues-, of materi-ai fact with respect to 
whether Rpc created a dangerous; condition on the ..premises and . 
further,. whether RSC took reasonable steps to protect invitees," 
precludes, summary, judgment,. Russell Sorense.n Construction's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is,, respectfully, d&nied* 
••
 :
. DATED this j D day of July, 2010, 
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The Honorable Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
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450 South State Street 
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• Re: Gonzalez v. Russell Sorensen Construction 
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t Also licensed in Colotado 
*A1*> licensed in Idaho 
Dear Judge Fratto: 
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1. Aguirre/Rosales v. Newell K. Whitney 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GUADALUPE RUIZ ORDUNEZ, 
GUADALUPE ELEN LAZARO ROSALES, 
and BEATRIZ CHAVEZ SANDOVAL,, 
Plaintiffi, 
v. 
NEWELL K. WHITNEY, RISUN 
TECHNOLOGIES, and MUDDY BOYS, ; 
INC., 
Defendants. 
DEaSION 
Date: March 3, 2010 
Case No. 080400743 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Division 2 J 
The matters before the court are the motions for summary judgment filed by all three 
defendants Newell K. Whitney ("Newell Whitney"), Risun Technologies, Inc. ("Risun") and 
Muddy Boys, Inc., ("Muddy Boys"). Oral arguments were'heard on the motions on February 1, 
2010, at which time the court took the motions under advisement. The court now issues this 
decision denying the motions for the reasons set forth below. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant Newell IC Whitney ("Newell Whitney") was building a home in Alpine ("the 
Home") from 2005 to sometime in 2007. Newell Whitney was the owner of the Home as well as 
the general contractor on the construction of the Home. Defendant Risun Technologies, Inc. 
("Risun") is owned by Bill Whitney, Newell Whitney's brother, Risun drew up the plans for the 
Home and obtained the necessary building permits for it. Apparently when Newell Whitney was 
Page 1 of 7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
procuring subcontractors for the Home, he signed some of the contracts as "agent" of Risun. 
There is a dispute regarding whether Newell Whitney had any actual or apparent-authority-to act 
as an agent on behalf of Risun. In his capacity as general contractor on the Home, Newell 
Whitney hired Muddy Boys, Inc. ("Muddy Boys") to do the drywall in the Home. Muddy Boys, 
in turn, hired Allstate Drywall ("Allstate") to hang the drywall. Other subcontractors were hired 
to do the taping and texturing on the drywall. 
The Home was approximately 13,000 square feet and included a four-story elevator shaft. 
On the morning of the accident, Newell Whitney told two Allstate Drywall employees to wrap an 
exposed beam and some television cable at the vety top of the elevator shaft. The two employees 
were Guadalupe Rosales and Ramon Aguirre. They apparently attempted to perform some work 
within the elevator shaft and were found a short time later at the bottom of the shaft in extremely 
critical condition and with injuries consistent with a long fall Ramon Aguirre was pronounced 
dead at the scene, and Guadalupe Rosales suffered severe, permanent injuries. Ramon Aguirre's 
wife, plaintiff Guadalupe Ordunez, filed suit against Newell Whitney, Risun, and Muddy Boys 
(collectively "Defendants") in case number 080400076, which was assigned to this court. 
Plaintiffs Guadalupe Rosales and his wife plaintiff Beatriz Chavez Sandoval (all plaintiffs 
collectively Plaintiffs") also filed suit against Defendants in a separate case, case number 
080400743, which was assigned to Judge Taylor. Both cases asserted causes of action for 
negligence against Defendants. On July 15,2008, this court signed an order of reinstatement and 
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consolidation ordering that case 08040007.6 be consolidated with casenumber 080400743. Rule 
42(a)(2) of the URCP requires the consolidated case to be heard by the judge assigned to the first 
case, which is this court • * • 
On September 11, 2009, Newell Whitney moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs 
opposed the motion, and Newell Whitney filed his reply and a request to submit the motion for 
decision with oral arguments. On October 23, 2009, Muddy Boys moved for summary judgment, 
and on October 26, Risun moved for summary judgment. All three defendants argued that 
summary judgment is proper because none of the parties retained control over the method that 
caused Plaintiffs* injuries. Plaintiffs opposed the motions filed by Risun and Muddy Boys, and 
Risun filed a reply and a request, to submit its motion for decision with oral arguments* Muddy 
Boys filed a reply on January 29,2010, The court heard oral arguments on all three motions on 
February 1,2010, 
DISCUSSION 
Thevmotions fotsumrha^ Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment and states that the court 
shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows "that there is no. genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c) (2009). In addition, "[t]he patty moving for summary judgment has the burden of 
presenting evidence that no genuine issue of material fact exists.'* Uintah Basin Med. Or. v. 
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Hardy, 2008 UT 15, % 16,179 P.3d 786 (citing Rule 56(e)). The Utah appellate courts have 
made clear that "the nonmoving party is entitled to all inferences arising from the facts of 
record." Id at % 18 (citing Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, \ 10, 48 P J d 235). Pursuant to 
this standard, the court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding the 
court from granting summary judgment to any of the Defendants, Specifically, the court 
concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Newell Whitney's duty of care 
as a possessor of land. There are also genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Risun 
and Muddy Boys were possessors of the land under a premises liability analysis. Therefore, 
summary judgment is not proper and the motions are denied. 
Plaintiffs concede that none of the Defendants are liable for negligence under a retained 
control theory of negligence, but they assert that this theory of negligence is irrelevant to their • 
case pursuant to Magana v. Dave Roth Const, 2009 UT 45,215 P.3d 143. In Magana, tfie Utah 
Supreme Court explained, 'The retained control doctrine is separate and distinct from a direct 
negligence theory. Specifically, the retained control doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff 
alleges that an employer's own actions were negligent." Id a t l 37, 
Plaintiffs assert that they are pursuing each of die Defendants for direct negligence on the 
basis of premises liability as set forth in Hale v. Beckslead, 2005 UT 24,116 P3d 263, and §§ 
343 and 343 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under this theory of negligence, a 
possessor of land is liable for physical harm caused to invitees by dangers on his land only under 
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specified circumstances. Specifically, section 343, entitled '"Dangerous Conditions Known to or 
Discoverable by Possessor," provides, 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care 
would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of . • 
harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable 
care to protect them against the danger. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343, Similarly, the relevant portion of section 343 A, "Known 
or Obvious Dangers," provides, "(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical 
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious 
to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
obviousness." Id. at § 343A. 
The court in Hale explained that the open and obvious danger rule as set forth in sections 
343 and 343 A of the Restatement was the applicable law in a case where the plaintiff was a 
painter working for the defendant owner of the home who was also the general contractor. 2005 
UT 24, at \ 14. The plaintiff in Hale was painting a portion of the defendant's home on the 
second floor of the home. Id. at K 3. A railing had not been installed on the second floor 
balcony, and the plaintiff stepped off the balcony when painting and was injured. Id. In further 
explaining tiie open and obvious danger rule, the court explained, "[Ijt is a duty-defining mle that 
simply states that, under appropriate circumstances, a landowner's duty of care might not include 
warning or otherwise protecting visitors from obvious dangers." Id. at \ 23. The court stated, 
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not require that landowners fully remedy potentially unsafe conditions, only that landowners 
adequately warn invitees about such dangers." Id. at % 30. The court then held that the grant of 
summary judgment was premature because "the Restatement rule requires an inquiry into 
whether factors existed to vest in the defendant a duty to warn or otherwise protect the plaintiff 
from an obvious harmf,]" and the facts regarding this inquiry were not developed below. 
In support of their argument that all Defendants were possessors of land under the open 
and obvious danger rule, Plaintiffs cite to section 384 of the Restatement. Section 384 provides, 
"One who on behalf of a possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition on the 
land is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same freedom from liability, as though he 
were the possessor of the land, for physical harm caused to others upon and outside the land by 
the dangerous character of the structure or other condition while the work is in his charge." 
Restat. 2d Torts § 384. Comment d to this section clarifies the application of this rule to 
contractors and subcontractors and states, "In such a case, the rule stated in this Section applies 
to subject the particular contractor or subcontractor to liability for only such harm as is done by 
the particular work entrusted to him/' Id at comment d. 
Neither the Utah Court of Appeals nor the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly adopted 
this section, but Plaintiffs argue that it applies to render each of the Defendants "possessors of 
land" within the meaning of the open and obvious danger rule. It appears that there are genuine 
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issues of material fact regarding which of the Defendants were in charge of the elevator shaft. It 
is the province of the finder of fact to determine which of the Defendants were "possessors" of 
the elevator shaft for purposes of premises liability and if they took reasonable steps to 
adequately protect the workers in that area. Therefore, Defendants' motions for summary 
judgment are denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment are denied. The court concludes that there 
are issues of material fact regarding which of the Defendants were possessors of the elevator 
shaft for purposes of premises liability and whether they took reasonable steps to protect workers 
in that area. Therefore, fee motions are denied. Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare an appropriate 
order consistent with this decision for signature by the court. 
DATED this 5 "day of March, 2010. 
Steven L. HansTsrt-
District Court Judge 
Case No. 080400743 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H _ „ 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT CAKE COUNTY 
*M 0?pu{y Clsfit 
g~ MATT CHRISTENSEN, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
J.L. HARDY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY aka 
J.L. HARDY CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 090906593 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
Date: May 25,2010 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Having fully 
considered the arguments, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the 
Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs' vicarious liability theory of "retained control"fails. However, 
Plaintiffs may proceed to trial on their two theories of direct liability. 
This case involves an accident at a construction site. Plaintiff, Matt Christensen, was injured when 
he fell approximately 12 feet down an open stairwell. At the time of his fall, Christensen was working on 
the Prime Business Center construction project. Defendant, J.L. Hardy Construction, had been hired to be 
the general contract for the project Defendant had hired Cobble Creek as a subcontractor to frame the 
building. Christensen worked for Cobble Creek as the project manager over this project1 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant is liable for Christensen's injuries. Plaintiffs argue three theories 
negligence. The first two are direct negligence theories: (1) that Defendant is liable as a possessor of the 
lAt the hearing, Defendant presented copies of deposition testimony which had not been 
attached to any of the memoranda regarding this Motion. Defendant argued that this testimony was 
material to the determination of the Motion. Plaintiffs objected. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs 
that it was improper for Defendant to rely upon new evidence at the hearing. Although Defendant 
argues that Plaintiffs* counsel was already aware of the deposition testimony, Defendant did not give 
Plaintiffs an appropriate opportunity to prepare to meet the proffered testimony. Therefore, the 
Court does not consider the new evidence. 
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land and (2) Defendant is liable for interfering with Christensen's work and forcing him to work in unsafe 
conditions. Plaintiffs third theory is that Defendant is liable under the indirect negligence theory of 
"retained-control" In bringing this Motion Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on any of the 
alternative theories of liability. Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot prove the cause of 
Christensen's injuries because there were no witnesses to the accident and Christensen himself does not 
remember the accident 
L Direct Negligence 
A Possessor of Land 
Plaintiff and Defendant disagree over whether Defendant can be held liable for failing to protect 
Christensen against the open and obvious harm of the hole. The Court is persuaded that Plaintiff can 
proceed on this tlieory of negligence. 
Hie Utah Ccse that governs this issue is Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24,116 P.3d 263.2 In Hale, 
the court adopted the Restatement Second of Torts §§ 343 and 343 A. Section 343 provides: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by 
a condition on the land if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to 
protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. 
Restat 2d of Torts, § 343. This section is read together with Section 343 A, which provides: 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them 
by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, 
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
Plaintiffs also cite Hah v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, 74 P.3d 628. However, the supreme 
court case overruled die court of appeals ca.se in part and so this Court will rely on the supreme 
court case to establish the rule. 
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obviousness. 
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or 
obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of 
the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm 
should be anticipated. 
Restatement 2d of Torts, § 343 A. ? 
In discussing these sections, Hale said, "the Restatement sections 343 and 343 A.. .defines 
the duty of care a possessor of land owes to invitees. It does not excuse negligence; it defines it. 
Where an invitee is injured by a condition on land from which the possessor did not owe a duty to 
protect the invitee, the possessor commits no negligence.1* Hale, 2005 UT 24 at $J3. "Where an 
invitee*s attention may be distracted, such that he will not discover what his obvious, or will forget 
what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it, a possessor of land may be liable for 
breaching his duty of care if he fails to warn . . . or to take other steps to protect [the invitee].M Id. 
at %26 (quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Pursuant to Restatement 2d of 
Torts § 384, a contractor is treated as a possessor of land if it "erects a structure or creates an other 
condition on the land." This rule has widespread acceptance, even though it has not expressly been 
adopted in Utah. See Smithey v. Suave Construction Co,, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3871 (D.S.D. 
2007) ("At least twenty-one other states, including several in this region, have followed the common 
law rule contained in § 384 and stated that a contractor working on behalf of a landowner stands in 
the landowners shoes for purposes of premise liability.")* 
The Court, is persuaded that it is appropriate to rely on Restatement 2d, Torts, § 3 84, and find 
that Plaintiffs can proceed to a jury trial on this theory of liability. As referenced above, this 
approach is widely accepted in other jurisdictions. Additionally, it reflects the sound policy that 
when the owner of propeity has relinquished control of his/her property to a general contractor, the 
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general contractor must then be responsible for the conditions it creates on the land. 
In the present case, there are clearly questions of fact regarding whether Defendant had a duty 
to protect Christensen from the hole into which he fell First* the parties dispute who created the 
hole. Defendant says that Cobble Creek had placed the floor joists and covered them with flooring, 
leaving an opening for the stairwell Further, Defendant asserts that Cobble Creek had a contractual 
obligation to ensure the safety of the stairs. Section 2.8 of the contract between Cobble Creek and 
Defendant reads in part: 
SUBCONTRACTOR, ITS AGENT, EMPLOYEES, MATERIALMEN AND 
LOWERTIERSUBCONTRACTORSSHALLPERFORMHISWORKINASAFE 
MANNER; (1) TO COMPLY WITH PREVAILING SAFETY REGULATIONS, 
INCLUDING THE APPLICABLE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT 
AND THE CURRENT REGULATIONS ADOPTED THEREUNDER, (2) TO 
PROVIDE SAFE TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT, (3) TO HOLD WEEKLY SAFETY 
MEETINGS, (4) TO INSTALL BARRICADES, SIGNS, FLAGS, LIGHTS AND 
OTHER SAFE GUARDS TO PREVENT INJURY TO WORKERS AND OTHERS 
ON OR ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE,. . . . 
Plaintiffs counter that Cobble Creek did not cover the stairwell because it was directed not to do so 
by the plans and specifications. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that another subcontractor installed 
the steel beams/columns for the stairwell and Cobble Creek just built around those. Plaintiffs say 
that the open stairwell was in a common area, to which multiple subcontractors/workers were 
exposed. Even though Cobble Creek had to perform its own work safely, it was not responsible for 
erecting barriers around hazards that it did not create and which posed risks to all workers on the job 
equally. Plaintiffs, therefore, assert that it was Defendant's responsibility to keep the open stairway 
safe based on the provisions of the contract between Defendant and Prime Business Center LLC 
wherein Defendant accepted responsibility for "safety controi,, and "supervision* at the job site. 
The Court disagrees with Defendant's assertion that the open and obvious doctrine does not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CHRISTENSEN V J . L . HARDY PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
apply to general contractor/subcontractor relationships in Utah. Defendant says that Dayton v. Free, 
148 P. 408 (Utah 1914) and Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22,979 P.2d 322, hold that the open and 
obvious doctrine doesn't apply to contractors. However, those cases are not directly on point 
Thompson clearly says that sections 413,416, and 427 of the Restatement Second of Torts "have no 
application when the injured person is an employee of the independent contractor undertaking the 
allegedly dangerous work." 1999 UT 22 at f30. Thompson does not discuss whether sections 343 
and 3 43 A apply to a general contractor or whether Utah will adopt section 3 84. In Dayton, the court 
held that the owner "having neither reserved nor exercised direction or control over the work, or the 
time or manner of doing i t , . . . owed him no duty to provide a safe place to work, or to warn or 
notify Mm of missed holes, or to guard against dangers incident to or created by the prosecution of 
the work, and certainly not to guard or protect him against the negligence of those who had employed 
him or with whom he labored." 148 P. 408 at 412. Dayton did not discuss a general contractor's 
liability to a subcontractor, only an owner's liability to a general contractor. To the extent that 
Dayton is inconsistent with Hale, Hale supercedes Dayton. 
At the hearing, Defendant asserted that English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993) controls. 
Although the Court has determined that it was improper for Defendant to present new arguments at 
the hearing that were not previously briefed, the Court disagrees that English dictates a different 
result In English, the court held that Section 343 and 343 A of the Restatement Second of Torts 
"does not extend to a hazard created by the invitee." Id. at 157. Here, there are questions of fact 
regarding who created the hazard. 
IL Interference with Job Duties 
Plaintiff alleges that the direct negligence alleged against Defendant relates to Defendant's 
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"affirmative actions that forced Matt to build the wall in question in a way that was less safe. But 
for J.L. Hardy's actions, Matt would have build the wall in a manner that not only would have been 
safer, but would have obviated the need for exposure to the open stairwell" Memo in Opp. at iv. 
The Court accepts that there are questions of fact regarding whether Defendant owed a duty to 
Plaintiff and whether Defendant breached that duty. Specifically, when the Court views the facts in 
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and accepts all of the assertions in Plaintiffs' expert reports, it 
is possible to conclude that Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff, that Defendant was negligent in its 
management of the construction site, specifically, the safety aspects, and that Defendant's negligence 
was a primary cause of Plaintiffs accident. This is sufficient to survive summary judgment 
Z Retained Control 
Defendant argues that it did not exercise control or "retain control" over the injury-causing 
work. The Court agrees with Defendant. 
The "retained control'' doctrine is discussed in the seminal case of Thompson v. Jess, 1999 
UT 22,979 P.2d 322, In Thompson, the defendant Jess contacted AmeriKan Sanitation and arranged 
for purchase and delivery of a large pipe. Id. at %2, When the AmeriKan employees, Dennis and 
Trevor Thompson, delivered the pipe, Jess asked them to install the pipe, Id. at $3. Despite 
responding that they were not equipped to erect the pipe, Jensen agreed to install the pipe and then 
Jess went back inside. Id, at fl4-5. Jensen and Thompson attempted to install the pipe and 
Thompson was injured in the process. Id. at ^|5, The court then discussed whether Jess would be 
liable for Thompson's injuries. 
The Thompson court discussed the "retained control" theory by noting that "Utah adheres to 
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the general common law rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical 
harm caused by another by an act or omission of the contractor of his servants/' Id. at f 13. "This 
general rule recognizes that one who hires an independent contractor and does not participate in or 
control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed owes no duty of care concerning the 
safety of the manner or method of performance implemented." Id. Nevertheless, the Thompson 
court noted that there are exceptions to the general common law rule, and that "retained control" 
is a narrow theory of liability applicable in the unique circumstance where an 
employer of an independent contractor exercises enough control over the contracted 
work to give rise to a limited duty of care, but not enough to become an employer or 
master of those over whom the control is asserted. The duty is such situations is one 
of reasonable care under the circumstances and is confined in scope to the control 
asserted, 
i&atflS. 
The Thompson court adopted the "active participation" standard to determine if an 
independent contractor exerted enough control to give rise to a duty of care. "Under the 'active 
participation' standard, a principal employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of its 
independent contractor's work if the employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over, the 
manner of performance of the contracted work." Id. at f 19. Examples of such control occur "when 
the principal employer directs that the contracted work be done by use of a certain mode or otherwise 
interferes with the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished." Id. (internal 
citations omitted). The court ultimately determined that Jess had not actively participated in the 
manner or method of performance and, consequently, was not liable to Thompson. The court 
reasoned that "[ajfter agreeing to erect the pipe, Jensen, not Jess, determined the method for bringing 
about the desired result The only control Jess exerted was in directing that the pipe be installed 
over the pipe stub. This amounted merely to control over the desired result." Id. at p4 . 
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The "retained control doctrine" has been clarified by subsequent cases. In Magana v. Roth 
Construction, 2009 UT 45,215 P3d 143, the court stated, 'the question of whether an employer 
actively participated is not simply whether ail employer participated in an injury-causing activity, 
but whether the employer controlled the means and methods by which the injury-causing activity was 
performed." Id. at $51. The court went on to say, that, regardless of whether the contractor had 
controlled some aspects of the subcontractor's work, the contractor had to "exert sufficient control 
over the independent contractor such that [the contractor cannot] cany out the injury-causing aspect 
of the workin its own way." Id, at %21 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, the aspect 
that the contractor controls must be the proximate cause of the injury. Id The court also rejected 
the plaintiffs argument that Campbell's general responsibility for safety at the site constituted 
"active participation," The Magana court stated that "a general obligation to oversee safety on a 
project does not equate to exerting control over the method and manner of the injury-causing aspect 
of the [sub-contractor's] work." Id, at f29 (citations and quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 
In Begaye v. BigD Construction Corp., 2008 UT 4,178 P.3d 343, the court determined that 
when the contactor "controlled the sequence of the task, as well as the workflow generally, but it 
had no discretion or control regarding the specifics of how [the wall] was built or which bracing 
method was used," this was insufficient to prove retained control. Id. at % 11. Additionally, although 
the contractor ordered the subcontractor to build the wall "when it could have stnt the employees 
home for the day or sent them to work on another wall, such discretion is insufficient to bring it 
within the scope of the 'active participation' standard." Id. at ^ 12. 
In the present case, even taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff 
simply cannot show that Defendant "retained control" over the injury-causing activity. It is 
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undisputed that Defendant never ordered Cobble Creek to build the wall in a certain manner. 
Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant should be held vicariously liable for the injury suffered 
because the combined effect of all of Defendant's actions (leaving the trench open, placing dirt hills 
in inconvenient places, requiring Cobble Creek to keep working or be replaced) effectively 
controlled Plaintiffs actions to the txt&nt that Plaintiffs were forced to perform their work in an 
unsafe manner. While these arguments may be presented under a direct negligence theory, as a 
matter of law they do not establish that Defendant actively participated in directing the injury-
causing aspect of the work. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs' claim under the "retained 
control" theory fails. 
J, Causation 
Defendant's final argument is that no one saw Christensen's accident and so Plaintiffs can't 
prove what caused it. This argument lacks merit. Though. Plaintiffs may not have evidence of 
exactly how Christensen fell, it is undisputed that he fell down the hole accidentally while working 
on the wall. There is no allegation that Christensen (a) jumped into the hole purposely, (b) wasn't 
working when he fell, or (c) was pushed. The Court concludes that on the facts of this case, 
Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to take the causation issue to the fact-finder. 
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CRestatementoftheLaw — Torts 
Restatement (First) of Torts 
Current through June 2009 
Copyright © 1934-2010 by the American Law Institute 
Division 2. Negligence 
Chapter 13. Liability For Condition And Use Of Land 
Topic 8. Liability Of Persons Other Than A Possessor, Vendor Or Lessor 
§ 384. Persons Creating Artificial Conditions On Land On Behalf Of Possessor For Bodily Harm Caused Thereby 
While The Work Remains In Their Charge 
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is sub-
ject to the same liability, and enjoys the same immunity from liability, as though he were the possessor of the 
land, for bodily harm caused to others within and without the land, while the work is in his charge, by the 
dangerous character of the structure or other condition. 
Comment: 
a. The words "on behalf of the possessor" are defined in § 383, Comment a. This Section applies to a person who 
on behalf of the possessor of land erects thereon a structure or creates any other artificial condition, whether m so 
doing he is acting as the possessor's servant or as an independent contractor and whether he does the work for re-
ward or gratuitously. 
b. It is not necessary that the charge of the erection of the building be entrusted directly by the possessor of land to 
the person whose liability is in question. It is enough that it is entrusted to such person by anyone whom the posses-
sor has authorized to act on his behalf in such a matter, as where a contractor undertaking to erect a building for the 
possessor of the land is authorized to sublet the entire undertaking or to make a subcontract for a definite part 
thereof. 
c. The rule stated in this Section applies to anyone who erects a structure upon land or alters the physical condi-
tion thereof on behalf of its possessor, irrespective of whether he does so as a servant of the possessor or as a paid or 
unpaid independent contractor. 
d. When work divided among several parties. A possessor of land may put a number of persons severally in 
charge of the particular portions of the work of erecting a structure or creating any other condition upon the land. 
Again, a general contractor employed to do the whole of the work may, by the authority of his employer, sublet par-
ticular parts of the work to subcontractors. In such a case, the rule stated in this Section applies to subject the par-
ticular contractor or subcontractor to liability for only such harm as is done by the particular work entrusted to him. 
This is also true where a master divides among several servants or contractors the erection of a structure or retains in 
his own charge a part of the task of erection. 
e. When preparatory work known to be improperly done. The situation to which the rule stated in this Section is 
usually applicable is that in which the contractor or servant has been negligent in performing the work entrusted to 
him. A servant or contrac- tor may, however, be liable even though he has done the work entrusted to him in a care-
ful and workmanlike manner. The particular work entrusted to the contractor, no matter how carefully done, may be 
safe only if certain preparatory work has been done by others. If so, a contractor who knows or should know that the 
preparatory work has been improperly done is subject to liability for any bodily harm caused by the fact that his own 
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perfect workmanship has been made dangerous by the improper preparatory work. So too, the work entrusted to the 
servant or contractor may be such that it necessarily creates a condition which is dangerous unless further steps are 
taken. In such a case the servant or contractor may be liable if he leaves the job in this dangerous condition, unless 
he has reason to expect that the necessary steps will be taken. The fact that his employer has retained charge of tak-
ing such steps or has entrusted them to another contractor is usually sufficient to warrant the servant or another con-
tractor is assuming that they will be taken. On the other hand, the circumstances may be such as to lead him as a 
reasonable man to realize that this will not be done. In such a case the servant or contractor, after he realizes or 
should realize that such steps are not likely to be taken, is required to exercise reasonable care to take such steps as 
are then practicable to remove the danger created by his work. 
Illustration: 
1. A, the general contractor for the erection of an office building, lets out to B the construction of the founda-
tions and to C the construction of the steel frame. The steel work, no matter how carefully done, will be insecure 
unless the foundations are properly laid. B's concrete work in the foundations is so badly done that a competent 
firm of steel constructors would immediately see that the foundation was unsafe. None the less C proceeds to erect 
the steel framework of the building. The work, as steel work, is perfectly done, but while the work is still going on 
the structure falls because of the insecurity of the concrete foundations. In its fall it causes harm to workmen of D 
who are doing other work upon the premises for A, and a part of its falls upon E, a traveller upon the adjacent 
highway. C is liable to the workmen and to E. 
Comment: 
f. When actor follows possessor's plans. The fact that the person erecting the structure or altering the physical 
condition of the land follows exactly the plans, specifications and directions of the possessor, does not necessarily 
prevent him from being liable under the rule stated in this Section. A servant or contractor entrusted with such work 
is usually entitled to assume that the plans, specifications and directions given him are such as will make the work 
safe. But they may be so imperfect or improper that the servant or contractor should, as a reasonable man, realize 
that the work done thereunder will make the structure or condition unsafe. If so, he will be liable even though he 
exactly follows the plans, specifications and directions. 
g. When possessor accepts work The rule stated in this Section applies to determine the liability of one who is en-
trusted by the possessor of land with the erection of a structure or the creation of any other physical condition 
thereon, for only such bodily harm as is caused v/hile he remains in charge and control of the erection or creation of 
the structure or condition. It does not apply to determine his liability for harm caused after his charge and control of 
the work and his privilege to be upon the land for the purpose of accomplishing it is terminated in any manner. His 
charge and control is usually terminated by the possessor's acceptance of the completed work, but it may be termi-
nated in a variety of other ways. For example, the possessor may, in pursuance or in violation of his contract, take 
the work out of the hands of the independent contractor before it is completed or may order a servant to stop the 
work entrusted to him. Again, the possessor himself may be ejected from the land by one who has a paramount title 
thereto or an injunction may prevent the continuance of the work. 
h. As is stated in this Section, one who, as servant or contractor, erects a structure or changes the condition of land 
on behalf of the possessor thereof, is subject to the same but no greater liability for bodily harm done to others while 
he remains in charge of the work as though he were the possessor of the land. 
As stated in § 333, a possessor of land is not required to maintain his land in a condition safe for the reception of 
trespassers except under the conditions stated in §§ 334 to 339. Therefore, a contractor or servant who so does the 
work entrusted to him that it is likely to injure persons who come into its vicinity, is not liable to trespassers even 
though he knows that they are, in fact, likely to be in the vicinity of the structure or condition created by him, unless 
the conditions stated in §§ 334 to 339 exist. So too, the servant or contractor, like the possessor of land, is not re-
quired to exercise care to prepare a safe place in which to receive gratuitous licensees. Like the possessor (see §§ 
340 to 342), he is only required to warn them of dangerous conditions of which he knows and of which they are 
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unlikely to be aware. The servant or contractor shares these immunities of the possessor because he has been put in 
exclusive charge of a part of the land for the purposes of accomplishing the possessor's will as to its development 
and use. When the work is accomplished and accepted and he is no longer occupying the land on the possessor's 
behalf, he ceases to share the possessor's immunities (see § 385, Comment b). 
i. The rule stated in this Section applies only to bodily harm caused by some structure erected or condition created 
by the servant or contractor. It does not apply to bodily harm caused by the failure of the servant or contractor to do 
any part of the work entrusted to him, except where such part is necessary to make safe a condition aheady created 
by him. This is so irrespective of whether the servant or contractor has or has not on previous occasions done similar 
work entrusted to him. As to the rules which determine the existence or nonexistence of liability under such circum-
stances, see § 383. 
Illustrations: 
2. A, who is erecting a building upon his corner lot immediately abutting upon two city streets, employs two 
contractors, B and C, the one to dig the cellar, the other to erect a fence between the excavation and the highway. 
C erects a flimsy fence on the one street but fails to erect any fence on the other. D, while walking along the one 
street is jostled by a fellow pedestrian and stumbles against the flimsy fence which gives way with him. C's liabil-
ity to D is determined by the rule stated in this Section. E, while walking along the other street stumbles and falls 
into the unguarded cellar. The rule which determines whether C is or is not liable to E is stated in § 383.3. Under 
circumstances identical with those stated in Illustration 2, except that A employs B to dig the excavation and to 
erect the necessary fence around it, B's liability to both D and E is determined by the rule stated in this Section. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
